- according to parapgraph at the very bottom here, this will at some point in the future result in warnings: https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/QuarkslabAndCryptographyEngineerAudits
- here is the talk that supposedly outlines why it's bad, haven't watched it yet: https://www.blackhat.com/us-18/briefings/schedule/index.html#compression-oracle-attacks-on-vpn-networks-10623
- overall seems like we should try to avoid implemention this
- ~~overall seems like we should try to avoid implemention this~~
- since this is not negotiated, we would be unable to speak to servers configured to use LZO if we chose this strategy. Instead we will (when comp-lzo is enabled):
- not compress outgoing packets
- decompress incoming compressed packets
- variant used for compression is lzo1x_1_15_compress, which is LZO1X with 2^15 (=32k) buffer size - see lzo.h:#define LZO_COMPRESS